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1  Introduction
The current global financial and economic cri-
sis began in December 2007 and sharpened in Sep-
tember 2008. The ‘global recession of 2009’ is con-
sidered by some authors as marking “the ending
of a global development cycle which began in the
early 1950s” (Gore 2010: 714). It has had and is con-
tinuing to have a considerable impact on different
geographic regions (Jara, Moreno and Tovar 2009;
Arieff, Weiss and Jones 2010; Fidrmuc and Korho-
nen 2010; Jha, Sugiyarto and Vargas-Silva 2010);
on national economies and cross-country as well
(Berkmen et al. 2009; Claessens et al. 2010; Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti 2011); economic systems, busi-
ness sectors, and companies. Significant research
was focused on impact of the global financial cri-
sis on different markets: equity, fixed income,
foreign exchange, and emerging markets (Melvin
and Taylor 2009).
The impact of this crisis varies within large limits
– both as intensity and lag time (delay) – depen-
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ding on how large, and powerful a national system
is, how much it is connected to the global econo-
my, and how sophisticated its banking infrastructu-
re is. Wolf (2010) demonstrates that sophisticated
finance does bring benefits (countries with larger
financial sectors in ‘60s grew faster over the next
three decades than those that did not). However,
this global crisis had a softer impact on economies
with less sophisticated financial products and, the-
refore, weaker ties with the American ‘bubble’ and
‘toxic’ financial products.
For some reasons (strong inter-links with many
global firms, size of the economy) the impact of
the crisis on the Romanian companies should be
harder while, for other reasons (not-so-sophistica-
ted financial products and services, government
actions), softer – but delayed.
The impact of the global economic and finan-
cial crisis on Central, Eastern and South-Eastern
European countries is presented by a Report of the
European Central Bank, synthetically, in terms of
key macro-economic indicators (Gardó and Martin
2010). As other transition economies, Romania has
faced a double-shock: “a sudden stop and reversal
of capital inflows, and an exports collapse due to
the global slump” (Nuti 2009: 7). 
It was in the summer of 2010 when the Romani-
an Government took action: the salaries in the
public sector were cut by 25% (June 2010) and the
state budget was amended (August 2010). It seems
that these actions of the Government have made
Romanian companies aware of the crisis rather
than the company managers’ own analyses and
predictions (Scarlat 2011).
The pharmaceutical sector is frequently inclu-
ded in the chemical industry, and it is usually focu-
sed on other topics than crisis impact (mostly inno-
vation, product development, strategy – as far as
mergers & acquisitions or outsourcing). In this
respect, other European countries are more attracti-
ve than Romania – as Germany (Schmidt 2011), Swit-
zerland (Seeger, Locker and Jergen 2011), Belgium
(Abrahamsen et al. 2011; Essenscia 2011; Teirlinck
and Poelmans 2012) or European market as a whole
(Festel and De Cleyn 2011). On the other hand, the
literature on the influence of global crisis refers to
the industry in general (notably, European Parlia-
ment - Policy Department Economic and Scientific
Policy: Impact of the Financial and Economic Crisis
on European Industries, Brussels, 2009) and less to
the management aspects.
Consequently, the references to the management
of Romanian firms facing the crisis are not rich, and
the literature on the crisis impact on the manage-
ment of the Romanian pharmaceutical firms is practi-
cally missing. This paper contributes to fill this gap.
The purpose of this paper is to present some
results of the research conducted in 2010 on how
the global financial and economic crisis has
impacted the management of the Romanian small
and medium size enterprises (SMEs) active in the
pharmaceutical industry. The research targeted
pharma SMEs from larger urban areas (cities with
a population larger than 100,000 inhabitants). The
focus was on the pharmacies’ management and
their managers’ strategic and current decisions.
More specifically, the research questions were:
(i) How fast the managers reacted facing the cri-
sis; (ii) How the crisis has influenced the firm stra-
tegy; (iii) Which were the decisions made by the
managers under the pressure of the crisis; (iv) How
the crisis has impacted the overall performance of
the firm.
The next section is dedicated to a quick but rele-
vant literature survey.
Then the paper’s structure is this: research
objectives and methodology; results followed by
discussion and conclusions. Some limitations are
also mentioned and further research is suggested
as well.
2 Theory framework
The term ‘financial crisis’ is applied to situati-
ons in which financial institutions lose significant
part of their value, abruptly and unexpectedly. Over
the last two centuries, many financial crises were
associated with banking panics, crashes of stock
markets, and the bursting of other financial bub-
bles, currency crises and sovereign defaults (Kind-
leberger and Aliber 2005, Laeven and Valencia 2008). 
The economic crisis mechanism is intimately
associated with the theory of free-market econo-
my. The current global crisis (for direct insights see:
Paulson, 2010) gave credit to Minsky’s model of the
credit system: Minsky (1986, 2008) stated that the
free-market financial system swings between
robustness and fragility (i.e. business cycle); after
recession periods when companies expect profits
to rise and lenders hope that the loans will be repaid
– hence the risk aspect. The development is expecta-
tion- and speculation-based (Hamm 2009).
Taleb (2007) has warned the bankers about
using in excess probabilistic models and missing
the possibility of catastrophic events (‘black swans’).
The metaphor of ‘black swans’ is used just to defi-
ne highly improbable, almost impossible to predict
events. “Instead of perpetuating the illusion that
we can anticipate the future, risk management
should try to reduce the impact of the threats we
don’t understand“ (Taleb et al. 2009: 78). More
recently, Paté-Cornell (2012) re-examines the con-
cept and adds the ‘perfect storm’ metaphor – to
describe “the unthinkable or the extremely unlike-
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ly” (as the extreme unlikely conjunction of three
different regular storms: a storm that started over
the US, a cold front coming from the North and the
tail of a tropical storm coming from the South).
Even less probably, the elements in conjunction are
cause-effect linked (see Fukushima accident: Scar-
lat, Simion and Scarlat 2011).
The current crisis was such an unexpected black
swan. Was it unavoidable? Trying to answer this
question, Kaplan et al. (2009) emphasize the role
played by the CROs (Chief Risk Officers). As the myth
of the rational market is gone (Fox 2009), the ‘black
swan’ events are behind standard deviations. The
unfamiliar and difficult-to-predict events make the
decision process incomparably more difficult. The
crisis dynamics and predictability are investigated
by more and more sophisticated mathematical
models and analyses of dynamic series. Akaev (Akaev
et al. 2010; Akaev, Fomin and Korotayev 2011) has
predicted a “second wave of the global financial-
economic crisis” - based on the “gold bubble” (price
of gold) and prices of other commodities. Other
theorists are more optimistic: the next economic
crisis could be avoided (Read 2009).
The crises arise from inherent problems in the
economy and, undoubtedly, their negative effects
are far more destroying for the economies. On the
other hand, a crisis is an opportunity in disguise
(Rumelt 2009: 35): “To survive – and, eventually, to
flourish – companies must learn to exploit it”. There
are companies and actually company managers
that perceive crisis circumstances as opportunities
rather than threats: they take action, restructure
their companies and/or product range, and get rid
of ballast: sell less productive units, discontinue
less profitable products, licence less talented people,
even leaving too risky markets. In pharmaceutical
terms, the company illness is cured and these kinds
of actions contribute to heal the economy overall;
i.e. the crises have some positive effects too – if the
company managers are strategically proactive and
responsive. 
Recent research (Gulati, Nohria and Wohlgezo-
gen  2010) shows that 9% of companies come out
of a recession stronger than ever. Even failing early
and fast in order to quickly recover and have a bet-
ter start during post-crisis recovery is familiar to
and used by many strategists: as example, UBS AG
(Union Bank of Switzerland) cut staff dramatical-
ly while recruiting young professionals in 2008; in
January 2009, the bank’s shares outperformed an
index of European banks over the previous quar-
ter (Economist 2009).
Hence: the importance of the responsiveness
facing crisis prospective and even crisis prediction.
The current global crisis has impacted the way
managers think strategically. Recent studies are
focused on SMEs (small and medium-size enter-
prises) strategic answers to crisis, in different regi-
ons. Ho et al. (2010) have examined the strategies
of the SMEs from Hong Kong under the ‘financial
tsunami’. They found ten factors as critical for a
company in an uncertain financial situation.
Before the crisis, the trend was towards longer
term decisions (five years or more). Foresight exer-
cises design scenarios and strategies by sectors or
regions, for time horizons of 10-15 years or even
more. This crisis is having a contrary effect – five
years horizon seems to be too long for strategic
decisions, because of the crisis turbulences. Will
the next phase of management practice continue
to be the classical strategic management (five years
time horizon, more or less)? Will it evolve to lon-
ger term foresight exercises and scenarios? Will it
become more conservative and risk averse (like
‘three-year-strategies’)? Looking for answers, the
opinions of the management gurus are reconside-
red. Excerpted elements from Peter Drucker’s pre-
vious works are brought to light by Kanter (2009):
strategic, long-term-vision is critical to leading
through turbulent times.
Finding the right strategy during and post-cri-
sis is vital for top managers (Sull 2009, 2010; Ghe-
mawat 2010, Gulati, Nohria and Wohlgezogen 2010).
Ghemawat argues that companies – under the
pressure of international trade shrinkage and the
still higher pace of China and India’s development
– “must factor these developments into their stra-
tegies in the new decade … the response will be to
retrench and focus on home markets … managers
cannot afford to ignore the risks of pursuing a glo-
bal strategy in the uncertain years ahead” (Ghe-
mawat 2010: 56). As the range of possible futures
is large and uncertainty high, the flexible strategy
is preferred to rigid strategic planning: “the com-
panies that nurture flexibility, awareness, and resi-
liency are more likely to survive the crisis, and even
to prosper” (Bryan and Farell 2009: 24).
This crisis definitely marks a new era in strategic
management – in terms of understanding the com-
pany strategy and strategic management by its
managers.
Examining the SMEs strategies under crisis, and
analyzing the critical factors for a company in an
uncertain financial situation, Ho et al. (2010) have
found that only two out of ten regard cost reducti-
on.
The management is a complex process even in
stationary systems; in turbulent periods its com-
plexity increases exponentially and all the compa-
ny functions are affected accordingly. Rigby, Gru-
ver and Allen (2009) pay special attention to ‘unwi-
se cost cutting during hard times’. Quelch and Jocz
(2009) offer ‘7 smart ways to economize on adver-
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tising’ as a good management reaction to consu-
mers’ strict priorities and reduced spending – a
strong argument against the typical reaction of
managers to cut costs.
The crises offer lessons to be learnt – not exclu-
sively for academia: lessons from the 90’s Asian
crisis (Sing and Yip 2000); how to recover after a
recession (Schendel, Patton and Riggs 1976; Hofer
1980; McLaughlin 1990); and how to use marke-
ting strategies to make the company recession-
resistant (Pearce and Michael 1997). “During the
crisis, it is vital to gain more information ... to sub-
stantially invest in marketing and distribution, to
limit abatements, and to ensure professionalism
in pricing despite the turbulences of the crisis”
(Schmidt 2011: 35).
Hence: the importance of the lessons learnt from
previous crises and wise decisions facing current and
future ones – not automatically cutting the costs of
marketing research, research and development, and
human resource.
The scope of this paper is not to display the his-
tory of crises or investigate their causes [political
roots of the multi-facets global crises should not
be under-represented; actually, “the crisis of the
euro zone is a geopolitical as well as an economic
event” (Mead 2012: 18)]. The paper intends to offer
a picture of how SME managers from Romanian
pharmaceutical industry are aware of these three
major actions:
Be proactive and act quickly
In an uncertain environment and future, act
strategically
Facing a crisis, act wisely (not necessarily cut-
ting the costs).
3  Research objectives and metho-
dology
According to the Health Ministry, there were
6,902 pharmacies in Romania at the end of 2010,
including 4,753 in urban areas
(http://www.ceepharma.com).
This research targeted pharma SMEs from urban
areas (population over 100,000 inhabitants). Accor-
ding to the Romanian law – in line with the Euro-
pean Union regulations – SMEs are firms with less
than 250 employees. For this reason, the sample
did not include the larger pharma chains. A sam-
ple of 475 pharma units was designed (10% of the
total number of pharmacies in urban areas). The
sample was representative as structure (number
of pharma units in the sample – proportional to
the city population). Then, the specific pharmacies
were selected randomly and the interview opera-
tors were trained accordingly.
The research focus was on the Romanian phar-
macies’ management and the overall research
objective was to identify the way their managers
acted facing the global economic and financial cri-
sis, and analyze the managers’ strategic and cur-
rent decisions. Addressing this objective, a set of
specific research objectives was set (observing the
three actions mentioned by the end of the previo-
us section):
(i) How fast they reacted; is the correspon-
ding lag time depending on the company size?
(ii) What impact the crisis had on company
strategy: did it change or not? If yes, how?
(iii) Which were the most common decisions
made by the managers under the pressure of the
crisis; where there any mistakes made? What sort
of? Is there a reason behind?
(iv) How has the crisis impacted the firm over-
all performance, in the managers’ view?
The survey was conducted between August-
September 2010, picturing a two year period (August
2008 - July 2010). The research methodology was
questionnaire-based survey – questionnaire was
designed to match the research objectives. It was
pretested and discussed with eight business owners
and managers during the first part of 2010, then
reviewed, and finally administered. To get a hig-
her rate of answers, the survey was completed as
a face-to-face interview.
As an exploratory survey, there was no age discri-
mination among firms. Not only business owners
and top managers, but also other managers or
employees were invited to answer the question-
naire.
4 Research results
The rate of return was pretty high (77.5% i.e. 368
filled questionnaires out of 475 pharma units
approached). For a couple of reasons (incomplete
information, more than 250 employees), eleven
questionnaires were rejected; finally, the data from
357 respondents were processed. The demographic
features (company size) are depicted below (Table
1). The sample was not designed to be representa-
tive in terms of the structure but to have enough
firms in each category – in order to characterize
that group.
Table 2 presents the necessary figures for a docu-
mented answer to the first survey objective (i).
Legend: sky-blue colour for microenterprises; gol-
den – small firms; green – medium size companies.
The total number of microenterprises in Table
2 (207) is not identical to that in Table 1 (208) becau-
se one microenterprise reacted earlier than August
2008 (as early as May 2008); this was a singular
and exceptional case.
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The total number of small firms in Table 2 (124)
is not identical to that in Table 1 (127) because two
small firms did not reacted yet (by the time of sur-
vey) and one small company has stated ‘do not
know’.
For these reasons, the number of SMEs in Table
2 (353) totals 4 SMEs less than in Table 1 (357).
There are several notable aspects of the research
results that answer to the first research question
– as pictured in Figure 1. The surveyed period of two
years (August 2008 – July 2010) is divided into two
equal periods, each of them with distinct features.
Period I: August 2008 – July 2009
The first reactions to crisis were visible as far
back as August 2008 (two microenterprises and
one small firm). This was an ‘early reaction’ – as
the following two months no reaction was repor-
ted and after other three months only (January
2009) more pharma SMEs (13) have reacted.
This relative maximum in January 2009 (Figu-
re 1) means a decision lag time of more than one
year – as far as early decisions.
Excepting January 2009, the whole period
August 2008 – July 2009 depicts
management/managers’ passivity.
Period II: August 2009 – July 2010
During this period, the reaction of the pharma
SMEs facing the crisis is stronger – meaning more
active management and more decisions made by
the managers. There is an oscillatory level of reac-
tion (‘up’-s and ‘down’-s), over a positive trend that
culminates with an absolute maximum in March
2010 (Figure 1). This means a decision lag time of
more than one year from early decisions in Janua-
ry 2009, and more than two years since crisis spark,
in December 2007.
After March 2010, the reaction level decreases
apparently; however, it is not clear if this decline
means less reaction in reality or it is just because
the survey ended by September 2010. Further
research would be recommended.
To note that oscillatory appearance (alterna-
ting ‘up’-s and ‘down’-s) is common to both periods.
All the above apply to all pharmacy sizes, excep-
ting the remark to the absolute maximum: it is in
March 2010 for pharma microenterprises, but in
January 2010 (two month earlier) for the small phar-
macies, and in September 2009 (six month earlier)
for the medium size ones. The data suggest this:
the smaller the company size, the slower in reaction.
This paradox (it was expected that smaller the firm,
more flexible and reactive it should be) may be
explained by weaker managerial skills of the mana-
gers in smaller companies. Deeper investigations
might be conducted in this respect (possible cor-
relations between the decision lag time and com-
pany age or industry). 
Table 3 depicts the impact of the crisis on the
company’s strategic approach (second research
objective).
It is surprising to note that:
As little as 85 companies out of 357 (23.81% i.e.
less than a quarter) decided that the crisis calls
for extreme decisions – which is changing the
company’s strategy;
Facing the global financial crisis, more than half
of the pharmacies (195 which represents 54.62%)
made no change in their strategies;
There is a worrying good part of 77 firms (21.57%)
that consider routine decisions as strategy
change – which is a strong evidence of lacking
the elementary managerial knowledge and cul-
ture.
Analysis by company size shows, in general,
same structure across preferences for strategy
change. However, the confusion is slightly more
common among microenterprises (59.74% compa-
red to 58.26%) while ‘No change policy’ is prefer-
red by the medium-sized pharmacies (7.70% vs.
6.16%). Small firms display a larger availability for
strategy change (38.82% vs. 35.58%).
Changes of the product range, changes in stra-
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Table 1 The structure of companies by size. 
Company size Number of companies [%]
Micro-enterprise (1 to 9 employees) 208 58.26
Small firm (10 to 49 employees) 127 35.58
Medium-size company (50 to 249 employees) 22 6.16
Total SMEs 357 100.00
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Figure 1 The level of pharma SME’s reaction to the global financial crisis (August 2008- July 2010, corresponding to        
Table 2, above). 
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tegic alliances, retrenching are the most common
strategy changes among the pharma SMEs. No case
of approaching new markets was reported.
The most frequent decisions made by the mana-
gers under the pressure of the crisis (the third
research objective) are presented in Table 4. More
than one third of the responding firms (38.37%)
made no decisions (no action facing the crisis), mea-
ning no responsiveness and lack of managerial abi-
lities ultimately.
The key results are:
Cost cutting was the most consistent reaction
of the companies facing the crisis; however,
observing the sample structure, microenterpri-
ses are less inclined to do it than small pharma-
cies (the size of microenterprises may be a valid
argument);
Layoffs are the second-in-line decision to face
the crisis; again, microenterprises are less acti-
ve in making this type of decision than small
pharmacies (the larger employee-base of the
second category might be a good reason);
In exchange, micro-pharmacies are more acti-
ve in making other decisions – as: increasing
the price (in-depth study shows about one in
five – 19.05%), reducing the inventory (17.69%),
product and sales promotions (11.56%);
The medium size firms made decisions related
to the range of products (less imports, new or
eco-products, even cheaper products), and inves-
ted in developing the firm’s identity and image;
Other frequent decisions: renegotiation of the
contracts (8.84% of all SMEs), new methods of
payment (6.12%), price discounts (4.76%), free-
zing the salaries and hiring process (4.08%).
Very few decisions (one or two of each type)
were related to: marketing research, staff trai-
ning, research in product innovation; better qua-
lity of the services provided to the clients.
The decisions made by types of costs which were
cut are important too. It is encouraging to notice
that cutting the administrative costs is more fre-
quent than cutting the research-development-inno-
vation, training and marketing costs.
The last research objective (crisis impact) is ful-
filled - as the data presented in Table 5 show. 
The impact of the crisis is seen in a broad dis-
play, from clearly positive to neutral to disastrous.
Overall, the crisis impact is perceived as slightly
negative (most of the opinions - 125). With respect
to the sample structure, the microenterprises have
a worse prospective (the percentage is maximum
for ‘disastrous’ and decreases to the minimum –
which corresponds to ‘clearly positive’ perception).
The situation is exactly the opposite for the medi-
um size companies and, more visible for the small
companies (the maximum value – 73.81% - is for
‘clearly positive’ and falls down to only 15.38% in
case of ‘disastrous’ future). This means that cri-
sis is perceived as more severe by the microenter-
prises.
To conclude, the microenterprises are not only
smaller but slower in reactions; they are more
reluctant to take action, and have a darker pro-
spective of the future. Their management
knowledge is limited and so is their arsenal of
managerial tools.
As overall result, the answer of the pharma SMEs
is ‘no’ to all three major actions: their manage-
ment/managers did not act quickly facing a crisis;
did not act strategically in uncertain environment
and future; did not act wisely, not necessarily cut-
ting the costs.
Journal of Business Chemistry 2013, 10 (1) © 2013 Institute of Business Administration 
Company size
Strategy change No change Confusion * Total
number [%] number [%] number [%] number [%]
Micro- 
enterprises 48 56.47 114 58.97 46 59.74 208 58.26
Small firms 33 38.82 66 33.33 28 33.77 127 35.58
Medium-size
companies 4 4.71 15 7.70 3 6.49 22 6.16
Total SME 85 100.00 195 100.00 77 100.00 357 100.00
Table 3 The changes in companies’ strategies - by company size. 
* Confusion means that respective company manager called a routine decision as a strategic one.
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5  Discussion and further research
As the Romanian financial system is not as
sophisticated as the Western one, it was expected
a late and not-so-devastating crisis impact. On the
other hand, the SMEs are the economy’s most dyna-
mic and flexible sector, able to take the challenges
(Scarlat 2003), and the links to the foreign corpo-
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Table 4 The types and frequency of decisions made under the pressure of crisis - by company size. 
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Company size
Number The impact of the crisis is perceived as:
[%] Disastrous Clearlynegative
Slightly
negative Neutral
Slightly
positive
Clearly
positive
Micro- 
enterprises
Number 22 67 79 21 13 6
[%] 84.62 74.44 63.20 44.68 48.15 14.29
Small firms
Number 4 23 36 23 10 31
[%] 15.38 25.56 28.80 48.94 37.04 73.81
Medium-size
companies
Number 0 0 10 3 4 5
[%] 0.00 0.00 8.00 6.38 14.81 11.90
Total SME Number 26 90 125 47 27 42[%] 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 5 The crisis impact on firms’ overall performance - as perceived by their managers. 
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Note: Totals do not match the total number of companies (357) - as more than one decision per company (max three) was allowed.
rations make Romanian companies more sensiti-
ve to crisis. The overall result was a delayed reac-
tion of the firms (up-to-two-years decision lag time).
The government has reacted even later (salaries in
public sector cut in June 2010). It is an explanation
but not an excuse for passive, inert management
of the Romanian companies (Scarlat 2011). The delay-
ed reaction of the Romanian firms, combined with
the hesitations in the public sector management,
lead to a longer crisis than expected; in addition to
this, the current euro crisis will worsen the situa-
tion (International Monetary Fund 2012).
The survey results suggest that smaller the com-
pany size, slower in reaction. This is explained by
weaker managerial skills of the managers in smal-
ler companies. Deeper investigations might be con-
ducted in this respect as well as trying to identify
other possible correlations: if the corresponding
decision lag time is depending – besides the com-
pany size – on industry or the company age.
The decisions made by Romanian managers
show a relative small number of options – as com-
pared to possible actions in front of a serious cri-
sis (Ho et al. 2010). Reasonable interpretations might
be:
the crisis is not perceived as serious by the
respective managers;
they do not know how to answer to such thre-
at (more likely).
Less than a quarter of surveyed SMEs decided
that crisis calls for extreme decisions – which are
changing the company’s strategy. SMEs have shown
serious lack of strategy knowledge and manage-
ment culture. The proportion can easily by higher
considering the possibility that ‘no change policy’
(195 out of 357 companies) might cover the lack of
any strategy!
The impact of the crisis is seen as negative by
two thirds of the pharma SMEs (241 out of 357) but
the percentage is higher for microenterprises: more
than four out of five (168 out of 208 which is 81%).
The smallest SMEs are more sensitive, the crisis is
tougher for them, and they feel the crisis impact
more clearly. The lack of management culture is a
key-issue within a vicious circle: no managerial
tools, no/slow action; no decision, then negative
impact, layoffs and cost cutting (management trai-
ning included) and so on. The crisis is more severe
for the smaller but most numerous SMEs.
Overall, the research results are positive; some
answers are offered but more questions arise. A
few lessons were learnt to improve the research
methodology – as format of the questionnaire (more
focused on management issues like decision making
cycle). Most of the survey results are in line with
previous research (Scarlat 2010, 2011).
A significant limitation of this research is that
only urban pharma firms were surveyed. However,
unless a further research will be conducted, there
are arguments to assume that in rural areas the
diagnosis and results will not be more optimistic.
6 Conclusions
This exploratory research aimed at identifying
characteristic elements of the Romanian pharma
SMEs’ management, under the pressure of the cri-
sis, by size. The results have matched the research
objectives and promisingly created a foundation
for further in-depth studies on correlations bet-
ween firms’ reaction and their performance, even-
tually by company size and age, region, or indus-
try.
6. 1  Late recognition and reaction
The early reactions to the global crisis were
reported as early as August 2008; January 2009
marked a local maximum; reaction increased to an
absolute maximum (March 2010), then decreased
but kept high to the end of survey period (July 2010).
A decision lag time up-to-two years was identified.
There is no strong argument for setting a definite
deadline for crisis impact.
The survey results demonstrate an even worse
situation for microenterprises: smaller the compa-
ny size, slower in reaction – explained by weaker
managerial skills of their managers.
6. 2  Lack of strategy
Less than one in four pharma SMEs (23.81%)
decided to change the strategy in order to fight the
crisis challenge. More than three quarters of the
SMEs have no real strategy: over half of them
(54.62%) made no change in their strategies and
almost a quarter (21.57%) made serious confusions
in terms of strategy. The most common strategies
among SMEs are rather defensive: change of the
product range, changes in strategic alliances, retren-
ching. Lack of strategy is almost equally distribu-
ted among pharma SMEs. 
6. 3  Lack of management knowledge and cul-
ture and skills.  Management errors
The most frequent decisions made by the mana-
gers under the pressure of the crisis are personnel
licensing and cost cutting as well as: price increa-
se, lower inventory, product and sales promotions,
salary freeze, contract renegotiation – following to
no clear strategy or set of priorities.
There is a strong evidence of lacking the ele-
mentary managerial knowledge among pharma
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SMEs as almost a quarter of the firms surveyed con-
sider routine decisions as strategy change. The stra-
tegy confusion is more common among microen-
terprises; they are more flexible, willing to act and
change but they lack the management arsenal and
knowledge.
6. 4 More severe crisis for microenterprises
The crisis impact is perceived as negative by two
thirds of the pharma SMEs surveyed; however, the
percentage is higher for microenterprises (more
than four out of five). The smallest SMEs are more
sensitive, the crisis is tougher for them, and they
feel the crisis impact more clearly. The crisis is more
severe for the pharma microenterprises.
7  Managerial implications
The major managerial implications are the les-
sons learnt: mastering the tools for crisis predicta-
bility; proactiveness and responsiveness; flexible
strategy; avoiding cutting the costs uniformly –
with little or no analysis and/or right priorities set.
Beside its importance as theoretical concept,
the decision lag time (applied in case of crisis) can
be used as an overall indicator of the strategic
management capacity: longer the decision lag time,
lower the strategic management capacity.
The research results and conclusions demons-
trate that managers of the Romanian pharmaceu-
tical SMEs display serious lack of management cul-
ture, strategy knowledge, and decision making
skills. Consequently, there is an urgent need to edu-
cate and train their managers.
The vicious circle of lacking the managerial cul-
ture (slow reaction – poor decisions – negative
impact on the company performance – …,) could
be broken by training programmes in management
(strategy, decision making, management skills).
As the crisis impact and lack of management
knowledge and skills is more profound among
microenterprises, their managers (entrepreneurs)
need training programmes in the same areas, with
a special focus on basic principles of business
management and entrepreneurship.
The research conclusions and recommendati-
ons are useful for both scholars and practitioners:
entrepreneurs and company managers, as well as
for management training institutions and univer-
sities, education policy makers who are striving to
develop the managerial capacity of the Romanian
pharma companies.
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